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Abstract—Recently, deep learning based natural language
processing techniques are being extensively used to deal with
spam mail, censorship evaluation in social networks, among
others. However, there is only a couple of works evaluating
the vulnerabilities of such deep neural networks. Here, we go
beyond attacks to investigate, for the first time, universal rules,
i.e., rules that are sample agnostic and therefore could turn
any text sample in an adversarial one. In fact, the universal
rules do not use any information from the method itself (no
information from the method, gradient information or training
dataset information is used), making them black-box universal
attacks. In other words, the universal rules are sample and
method agnostic. By proposing a coevolutionary optimization
algorithm we show that it is possible to create universal rules
that can automatically craft imperceptible adversarial samples
(only less than five perturbations which are close to misspelling
are inserted in the text sample). A comparison with a random
search algorithm further justifies the strength of the method.
Thus, universal rules for fooling networks are here shown to exist.
Hopefully, the results from this work will impact the development
of yet more sample and model agnostic attacks as well as their
defenses.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, Natural Lan-
guage processing, Text misclassification
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the fast development of deep learning (DL)
brought great changes to techniques in many fields. Deep Neu-
ral Networks (DNNs) have been extensively applied in many
fields, such as image recognition [7], computer vision [12],
and natural language analysis [6]. In fact, DNNs achieve even
human-competitive performance in many fields. Meanwhile
the security problem of DNNs has become a critical topic.
Several recent studies [10, 11] demonstrate that some artifi-
cial perturbations can easily make DNN-based image or audio
classifiers misclassify. Szegedy C. et al [34] first revealed the
sensitivity to artificial perturbations. Specifically, the state-of-
the-art GoogLeNet would misclassify the adversarial images
generated by ”fast gradient sign” algorithm [10], while a
D. Li carried out the experiments and wrote the manuscript with sup-
port from D. V. Vargas. K. Sakurai helped supervise the project. D.
V. Vargas conceived the original idea and supervised the project. Code:
https://github.com/ldxhdsz/research.git
Fig. 1. Example of a crafted universal rule (sequence of prototype-matching
based perturbation procedures) for fooling text classification. Using the
technique proposed in this paper it is possible to craft a universal rule
which automatically create adversarial samples, i.e., once the universal rule
is crafted no search is needed anymore. In fact, the universal rule will only do
a few perturbations which is imperceptible to typos. In the figure, adversarial
samples are generated by one universal adversarial rule (changes to the
original sample are shown with a different color. Swapping is shown in red,
deletion shown in green, insertion shown in blue.).
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human observer can still classify correctly almost without
noticing the artificial perturbations. These studies revealed the
fact that the adversaries could potentially fool the state-of-
the-art DNNs by crafting perturbations. Additionally, some
researchers even investigated adversarial images created under
extremely general or limited scenarios, such as universal
adversarial perturbations [18] and one-pixel attack [28] for
DNNs.
In the domain of text processing, DNN-based Natural
Language Processing (NLP) could learn non-linear models,
overcoming traditional NLP’s linear model. Moreover, deep
learning learns the language features itself without extract-
ing, achieving higher precision. However, a recent study has
revealed that artificial perturbations could also make DNN-
based text classifiers misclassify. Unfortunately, DNNs for
natural language processing have not got the attention they
deserve and until recently previous attacks did not propose an
effective algorithm for generating adversarial texts. Bin Liang
et al. demonstrated that the text classification done with DNNs
can also be attacked similarly to image or audio classification
DNNs [2]. They successfully crafted adversarial samples for
DNN-based natural language text classifiers.
Here, we propose a technique that aim to overcome some
of the limitations of previous ones. First, in [2] for locating
Hot Training Phrases (HTPs) or Hot Sample Phrases (HSPs),
the training dataset, features of data, dimensions of the model,
classification items and some other information are necessary
when crafting the adversaries. However, in practice, the con-
ditions and data necessary are mostly unavailable. Second,
there is a strong dependence on gradients which are not
always available, i.e., in [2] if the cost gradients could not
be computed, it is hard if not impossible to get the HSPs.
In this paper, we propose a technique that can craft ad-
versarial samples for a general black-box scenario. In fact,
our proposed method creates a universal rule that can create
adversarial samples automatically, i.e., no search is necessary
(Fig. 1 shows an overview of adversarial text samples crafted
by a universal rule). Since the pertubation only change a few
letters of a phrase, this attack is almost imperceptible. The
novelty of this work lies in proposing:
• Universal Rule - The current approach is the first to
create an automatic rule pattern that can process samples
rapidly and output adversarial samples. This goes beyond
universal perturbations to create yet another layer of ab-
straction which allows pertubations to change depending
on the sample.
Comparing to previous works our proposal has the following
main advantages.
• Automatic (Universal Perturbation) - No need for
searching for adversarial samples. The creation of an
adversarial sample is done by a rule that changes some
letters according to a learned pattern.
• Black-box Attack - There is no need to get any informa-
tion of the target model and training dataset in advance;
our approach could straightly act on an artificial test
dataset. In fact, we use a metaheuristic to search instead
of heuristically searching for important tokens [9].
• Non-Gradient Method - The proposed method does not
compute or need to compute cost gradients. To create
a universal rule, a novel black-box search algorithm is
employed.
• Imperceptible - Every sample phrase can only be per-
turbated five times or less. Thus the resulting sample is
imperceptible to human observers.
II. RELATED WORK
With the development of DL, DNNs have been widely
applied in many fields an therefore DNNs’ security problem
came to be of utmost importance. There have been many
works investigating the security of DNNs as well as identifying
its vulnerabilities by proposing several attack methods [1],
including black-box attacks [26] and the white-box attack [15].
Various methods and algorithms are proposed to generate ad-
versarial samples, including gradient-based (e.g. ”fast gradient
sign” algorithm proposed by I.J.Goodfellow et al.) [10, 11, 19],
greedy approaches (e.g. greedy perturbation searching method
proposed by S.M. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.) [21, 17] , and
evolution-based (e.g. one-pixel attack proposed by Su Jiawei
et al.) [19, 28].
Some researchers consider that the state-of-the-art deep neu-
ral networks are highly vulnerable to gradient-based methods
which is easy to use as well. For instance, in recent years
Moosavi D. et al. proposed systematic algorithm [18] for com-
puting universal perturbations which caused natural images to
be misclassified with high probability. In addition, Su Jiawei et
al. proposed one-pixel attack by using a differential evolution
to search under an extreme limited scenario. Therefore, there
are many types of optimization methods which result in high
misclassified rates for DNN-based image classifiers.
Unfortunately, there are no studies paying attention to
methods or algorithms for generating universal perturbations
against DNN-based text classification. Text as a discrete
data is also sensitive to perturbation, however, the geometric
correlations among the high-dimensional decision boundary
of classifiers couldn’t be found in text data, so the existing
algorithms for generating adversarial images cannot be directly
applicable for text. Recently, Bin L. et al. proposed the first
attack for deep text classification[2]. Additionally, Bin Liang
et al. demonstrated that since text is a kind of discrete data,
when directly adopting existing image or audio perturbation
algorithms the resulting text sample may lose its original
meaning or even become meaningless for human observers [2].
Thus, in order to craft imperceptible adversarial text samples
without losing their original meaning, they presented three
perturbation strategies: insertion, modification, and removal.
To craft them, they used the cost gradients for original text
and training samples to generate adversarial samples.
In order to maintain the meaning of a text sample, they per-
turbated the sample by directly modifying its words, inserting
new items (words or sentences) or removing some original
ones from it. First, for all training samples the cost gradients
of every dimension in all character vectors are calculated.
They termed phrases with significant cost gradients to the
current classification as HSPs. Additionally, the most frequent
phrases in all training samples of the target classification are
termed as HTPs. For insertion strategy, HTPs form target
classifications are inserted into the text samples nearby phrases
with significant contribution to the original class which result
in the increase in confidence of target class and decline in
original classification confidence. In modification and removal
perturbations, HSPs for original classification are modified
or removed which could generate the drop off in original
confidence. Fig. 2 presents an example of the three proposed
perturbation strategies.
Fig. 2. An adversarial text sample generated with Bin Liang et al. [2]
proposed perturbations. Inserting a gorged fact: Some exhibitions of Navy
aircrafts were often held here., removing an HTP: historic, and modifying an
HSP: Castle. The output classification is successfully changed from Building
to Means of Transportation.
III. TARGET MODEL AND SETTINGS
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) which is typically
used in computer vision can also be applied to problems in
Natural Language Processing and perform quite well. Location
invariance and local compositionality made intuitive sense
for images but not so much for NLP. Considering all this,
it seems like CNNs wouldn’t be a good fit for NLP tasks.
However, CNNs are fast and efficient in terms of NLP tasks
as well because they can extract relationships from words and
sequences.
A recent study investigates the use of CNNs to learn
directly from characters without the need for any pre-trained
embeddings [35]. However, results show that learning directly
from character-level input works very well on large datasets
(millions of samples) but underperforms in simpler models on
smaller datasets (hundreds of thousands of samples). There-
fore, we apply a common CNN for text classification [3].
For model training and evaluation, we use the same as in [3]
which employs the Movie Review data from Rotten Tomatoes.
This dataset contains 10, 662 movie review sentences, half
positive and half negative. Positive and negative sentences are
loaded from the raw data files and cleaned for feeding input
texts into the network. Additionally, instead of using the pre-
trained word2vec vectors for word embeddings, this model
directly learn embeddings from scratch. In other words, the
first layer words are embedded into low-dimensional vectors
and afterwards the next layer performs convolutions over the
embedded word vectors using multiple filter sizes. This is
followed by a max-pooling over time and a last layer of fully-
connected neurons with dropout regularization which outputs
in a softmax layer (Figure 3 shows the models for the two
types of DNN models used).
IV. UNIVERSAL RULE
The proposed method is both a random search and a
coevolutionary optimization algorithm for generating universal
rules that can create adversarial samples for DNN-based
natural language text classifier [3]. Before introducing the
optimization algorithm, the three perturbation procedures of
which the universal rule is consisted of are explained in detail.
The universal rule is made of a sequence of perturbation
procedures which can be either swapping, deletion or insertion
procedures (the whole procedure is illustrated and explained
in Fig. 7). Each of these procedures are described in detail
below. The universal rule itself is made of many perturbation
procedures in sequence. However, that does not mean a text
will be perturbed many times because there is a limit to the
number of pertubations set to five. Note that although this limit
is set, in a given sample most of the time there will be three
or less perturbations. This happens because it is hard to find
matching letters for each rule. In fact, we found that three
perturbation methods performed not well in practice when
used separately. Using only one such perturbation for attacking
could get 3% fooling rate at most because many of the rules
cannot find a pattern that matches them. Therefore they fail to
modify the sample not mention make it misclassify. Thus, we
use 10 or more different perturbations to make up a universal
rule.
A. Swapping Perturbation Procedure
A swapping perturbation procedure is defined by two letters.
These are the letters that will be searched for among words in
the original text sample. Once it is located in a word, the two
letters in the word will be swapped and the word becomes a
slightly misspelled word. The results of our test show that even
such imperceptible change could make the DNN text classifier
misclassify.
For example, Fig. 4 shows a text sample classified as
positive review class. Swapping letters of the word in the
sample just one time, the perturbed sample is classified as
negative review class. However, for human observers, we still
can recognize the text as a positive one and even know the
misspelled word is rock.
B. Deletion Perturbation Procedure
The deletion perturbation procedure deletes a letter from
matched word in a sample. This procedure is defined by two
letters. Given these two letters, the procedure searches for them
over the text and once it founds a match the second letter is
deleted from the word. Fig. 5 shows an example, the deletion
perturbation is [o, o], after deleting the second o the text’s
classification changed from negative review to positive review.
Fig. 3. Applied Convolutional Neural Network models for text classification (DNN-1 and DNN-2) [3]
Fig. 4. An adversarial text sample generated by swapping the two letters
(two elements of perturbation, shown in red).
Fig. 5. An adversarial text sample generated by deletion method, the second
perturbation element o is deleted after being located (shown in green).
C. Insertion Perturbation Procedure
The insertion perturbation procedure perturb the classi-
fication probability by inserting a letter into a word. The
misspelled word might lead to the decrease of the original class
confidence or the increase of the miss-class confidence. This
procedure consists of three letters which works by searching
for the first two letters in a word over the text. When a match
is found the third letter is inserted after them. In Fig. 6 an
example is presented in which two letters i and l are located
in the word film, then it is perturbed into a misspelled word
filam and results in misclassification.
V. UNIVERSAL RULE EVALUATION
To develop universal rules it is necessary to create some
ways to evaluate them. Here, we propose two types of fitness
Fig. 6. An adversarial text sample generated by inserting the third element
a of the perturbation [i, l, a], when it is located in the original word film.
function. One based on accuracy and the other based on utility
and therefore the names: accuracy fitness and utility fitness.
Regarding the accuracy fitness, it is defined as the success
rate of the attack from all universal rules created with the
individual. Notice that this measure also depends on the
sample and the other individuals that take part on the universal
rule set. Thus, given the attack success of a given sample
AttackSuccessi (1 when the class changed and 0 otherwise),
the accuracy fitness Fa can be obtained by:
Fa =
1
n
∑
i
AttackSuccessi, (1)
where n is the number of times a given individual is evaluated.
Notice that n may vary from individual to individual since they
are randomly picked each time a universal rule is created.
Regarding the utility fitness, universal rules should per-
turbate the sample a given number of times. Although the
maximum number of times that it can perturbate is set,
there is no guarantee that it will perturbate this number of
times. Moreover, many individuals which code perturbation
procedures fail to perturbate in most of the samples. To avoid
inactive individuals, a utility fitness is defined in which the
value is the number of times an individual perturbate divided
by the number of times it was chosen to participate in a
Fig. 7. Example of a universal rule containing one of each perturbation
procedure, i.e., insertion, swapping and deletion. For every text sample, the
universal rule applies the perturbation procedure which appears first. In this
case an insertion procedure. If it could not find a match it then continues with
the next perturbation procedure in sequence. Perturbations that can match
and modify the sample are counted and if the maximum of perturbation is
reached the modification (attack) ends. If the universal rule reaches the end
of the sequence then the modification (attack) also ends.
universal rule. Therefore, considering Fu the utility fitness
and Perturbatei a variable that is either 1 when sample i
is perturbated or 0 otherwise, the following equation defines
it explicitly:
Fu =
1
n
∑
i
Perturbatei, (2)
VI. RANDOM SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL RULE
OPTIMIZATION
In this paper, we propose two methods to develop universal
rules. The first one is a simple method called random search
for universal rule optimization (RS). The method consists of
a variation of a random search procedure in which the best
universal rule found is stored and returned as the output.
Specifically, the individuals of the population are made of
perturbation procedures of the types described in Section IV.
In each generation, first a new set of individuals is generated.
Afterwards, 100 universal rules are created by combining the
individuals into sequences. Lastly, new individuals are created
by mixing the individuals of the population using a differential
operator like rule. Since, the initial individuals are randomly
spreaded inside the hypercube of possible perturbation proce-
dures, the differential evolution operator will create random
walks in this space.
VII. COEVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM FOR UNIVERSAL
RULE OPTIMIZATION
Here we propose the Coevolutionary Algorithm for Univer-
sal Rule Optimization (CAURO). The aim of the method is
to find universal rules efficiently based on the combination
of useful and accurate small perturbations rules. Since the
number of perturbation procedures is not fixed as well as the
order and permutation of these perturbation procedures are
also as important as the perturbation procedures themselves,
coevolution seems to be a good match. The objective here
is to focus more on the combination of good rules rather
than on creating one. Moreover, we hypothesize that the
optimization landscape for searching for universal rules is not a
well behaved space to search, since good universal rules might
be far away from each other with many less good solutions
around.
The algorithm consist of generating perturbation procedures
to compose a population at first and then randomly picking
individuals to compose universal rules. Each time a universal
rule is picked, it is evaluated in the dataset and have its
constituting individuals update both its accuracy and utility
fitness. This evaluation process is illustrated in Figure 8. After
a universal rule is created many times, the algorithm will rank
individuals by accuracy and utility fitness. This is followed up
by a simple selection process in which 20% of the individuals
with lowest accuracy fitness and 20% of the individuals with
lowest utility fitness are replaced by new random generated
individuals (Figure 9). This composes the new population for
the next generation.
VIII. EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack method by comparing the rate of misclassification of
the best universal rule generated per generation. The experi-
ments are conducted on the movie review dataset from rotten
tomatoes with two different DNN models. Moreover, if most
of the perturbation procedures in a universal rule are able
to perturbate a text sample, they may modify a sample too
many times. This might cause the text sample to result in
a meaningless sentence even for human observers. In fact,
since such an attack alters the content of the text sample it is
considered a failed attack. To avoid this problem, we decide
that a sample can only be modified five times at most by a
universal rule.
In Figure 10, the misclassification rates of the best generated
universal rules by RS and CAURO are shown. After 100 gen-
erations, the best misclassification rate of RS reached 9.29%
while CAURO achieved 38.67%. In other words, CAURO
creates universal rules which can fool DNNs with higher
accuracy than RS. Moreover, with the increase in the number
of perturbation procedures, misclassification rates continues
to increase. Notice that although the number of perturbation
procedures in one universal rule increases, the maximum
number of perturbation is fixed and kept at five per sample for
all tests. The performance of the proposed method CAURO is
clearly superior to RS. This shows that selection for better
perturbation procedures as well as the utility and accuracy
fitness are important to find better universal rules. In Figure 11,
additional results are shown for the same dataset but with a
different DNN (DNN-2 is used, for the description of the
model please refer to Figure 3). This time the performance
Fig. 8. Evaluation of universal rules. For every rule, k individuals encoding perturbation procedures are randomly selected the population. Afterwards, the
universal rule perturbs the dataset following the sequence of perturbation procedures it is made of. Given the accuracy and utility fitness, the individuals
evaluation is updated together with their ranking. This process is executed many times until a certain number of universal rules are generated and consequently
many individuals are already evaluated.
Fig. 9. Overall illustration of the CAURO method proposed. Since CAURO is a coevolutionary method the individuals do not encode the solution but rather
building blocks of the solution. Every generation universal rules are generated many times, individuals are evaluated. Afterwards, the most fitted ones are
selected to continue to the next generation while new individuals are randomly generated to fill up the population.
decreases but it is still capable of achieving more than 20%
success rate after 100 generations.
Fig. 10. Misclassification rate in % (ordinate) per generation (abscissa)
for both the CAURO and RS while attacking DNN-1. Each graph shows
the evolution of universal rules with a different sequence of perturbation
procedures (5, 10 and 30). However, the maximum number of perturbation
per sample is fixed to five.
Regarding the number of perturbations per rule, the reason
for the low misclassification rates when universal rules are
small (5 or 10 perturbations in one rule) can only be justified
by the fact that matching rules is a difficult process. In fact,
by looking at the data for the 30 perturbations in one rule
case, we verified that even with 30 perturbations CAURO’s
crafted universal rules only modify 94% of the test samples
with on average 26% of the text samples being modified five
times. Therefore, even for the case in which more perturbations
are encoded in one universal rule, 74% of the text samples
are still perturbated less than five times. In other words, the
experiments show that rules will often fail to match the text
sample, resulting in a non perturbated one. Moreover, with few
perturbation procedures in one rule (e.g., 5 or 10 perturbations
Fig. 11. Misclassification rate in % (ordinate) per generation (abscissa) for
CAURO while attacking DNN-2. Each graph shows the evolution of universal
rules with a different sequence of perturbation procedures (5, 10 and 30).
However, the maximum number of perturbation per sample is fixed to five.
in one rule), matching rates possibly becomes more important
than misclassifying rate. This happens because every single
perturbation procedure that matches and perturbs, increase
the misclassification rate. Consequently, individuals encoding
perturbation procedures with rare but accurate perturbations
should not survive in the such populations.
Thus, it is possible to create universal rules that can create
adversarial samples without the need to search for them.
Actually, 38% and 20% success rate might not seem much at
first glance. However, this is not an adversarial attack success
rate but rather a universal rule success rate. This means that
once an universal rule is found, no search is necessary for a
given sample to become an adversarial sample because they
are generated by just applying a simple universal rule made of
a sequence of perturbation procedures. We point out that the
strong representation power of state-of-the-art neuroevolution
methods using unified neural models [32] and the adaptiveness
of self-organizing classifiers (which can adapt to changes in
mazes similar to rats) [33] and MAP elites (which can adapt
to malfunctions).
IX. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Previous research has shown that DNN-based text classi-
fication is also vulnerable to the gradient-based adversarial
samples. In this paper, we show the existence of universal rules
(perturbations created from rules which are sample agnostic)
that can fool state-of-the-art text classifiers.
In summary, this paper has the following main achieve-
ments:
• Universal Rules - We have shown that it is possible to
generate universal rules that are sample agnostic, i.e.,
rules that can create adversarial samples without any
search and independent of the sample given.
• CAURO - The proposition of a coevolutionary algorithm
(CAURO) for generating universal rules efficiently. In
fact, it is the first time that a coevolutionary algorithm
is applied to adversarial machine learning.
The results achieved here should impact new adversarial
attacks as well as their defenses. CAURO can be extended to
other types of input such as images as well as can incorporate
other types perturbation procedures, e.g. the repetition of
words in the text or even more complex forms of perturbation.
Adversarial samples used here can be used to investigate the
reason of the attacks and their respective defenses. Moreover,
we expect our work to also incentivate new methods that could
themselves, without any kind of specifically designed defenses,
overcome the current limitations.
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